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Reforming the European Monetary Union

Author

Listed:
  • V. V. Chari
  • Alessandro Dovis
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

Abstract

We offer a theoretically based narrative that attempts to account both for the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and for the challenges it has faced. Lack of commitment to policy plays a central role in this narrative and leads to four policy implications for EMU redesign.

Suggested Citation

  • V. V. Chari & Alessandro Dovis & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2017. "Reforming the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy Paper 17-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmep:17-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(7), pages 1329-1356, October.
    2. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    3. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    4. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2016. "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2458-2493, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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