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Regional Debt in Monetary Unions: Is it Inflationary?

Author

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  • Hubert Kempf

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Russell Cooper

    (University of Texas at Austin [Austin])

  • Dan Peled

    (University of Haifa [Haifa])

Abstract

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with non inflationary consequences ? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank ? We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of the holdings of the regional debt. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of policy measures within a monetary union.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Hubert Kempf & Russell Cooper & Dan Peled, 2010. "Regional Debt in Monetary Unions: Is it Inflationary?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00468945, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00468945
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    3. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is it is or is it ain't your obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00310512, HAL.
    4. Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(7), pages 1329-1356, October.
    5. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396.
    6. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Debrun, Xavier, 2007. "The new stability and growth pact: A first assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 453-477, February.
    7. Carlos E. Zarazaga, 1993. "Hyperinflations and moral hazard in the appropriation of seigniorage," Working Papers 93-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    8. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is It Is Or Is It Ain'T My Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1469-1504, November.
    9. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    10. Russell W. Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2001. "Dollarization and the conquest of hyperinflation in divided societies," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 25(Sum), pages 3-12.
    11. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    12. Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "Efficiency and Determinacy of Equilibrium under Inflation Targeting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 327-344.
    13. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
    14. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-571, October.
    15. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Régis Breton & Mariana Rojas Breu & Vincent Bignon, 2013. "Monetary Union, Banks and Financial Integration," Post-Print hal-01685888, HAL.
    2. Roch, Francisco & Uhlig, Harald, 2018. "The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-13.
    3. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2009. "Insulation Impossible: Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union," NBER Working Papers 15176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Antoine Camous & Russell Cooper, 2019. ""Whatever It Takes" Is All You Need: Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 38-81, October.
    5. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath, 2015. "Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1727-1779.
    6. Daniel, Betty C. & Shiamptanis, Christos, 2012. "Fiscal risk in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1289-1309.
    7. Sokolova, Anna, 2015. "Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 189-198.
    8. Sokolova, A., 2014. "Sovereign Risk and Monetary Policy," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 56-82.
    9. Matheron, J. & Mojon, B. & Sahuc, J.G., 2012. "The sovereign debt crisis and monetary policy," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 155-167, April.
    10. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    11. Nadjeschda Arnold & Ray Rees, 2015. "The Sovereign Default Problem in the Eurozone: An Insurance-Based Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 5389, CESifo.
    12. Antoine Camous & Russell Cooper, 2014. "Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility," NBER Working Papers 20650, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Russell Cooper, 2012. "Exit from a Monetary Union through Euroization: Discipline without Chaos," NBER Working Papers 17908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Jasper Lukkezen & Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, 2013. "Stochastic debt sustainability indicators," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 97-121.
    15. Betty C. Daniel & Christos Shiamptanis, 2010. "Sovereign Default Risk in a Monetary Union," Working Papers 2010-3, Central Bank of Cyprus.
    16. Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold, 2016. "The Sovereign Default Problem in the Eurozone - Why Limited Liability Resulted in Excessive Debt Accumulation and How Insurance Can Counteract," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 66.
    17. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    18. Cooper, R. & Kempf, H. & Peled, D., 2009. "Monetary rules and the spillover of regional fiscal policies in a federation," Working papers 233, Banque de France.
    19. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2015:i:153 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Union; seignorage; monetary policy; fiscal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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