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Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state

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  • David K. Levine
  • Salvatore Modica

Abstract

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their ?exclusiveness? we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently ?extractive? in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.

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  • David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state," Working Papers 2013-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2013-023
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    Cited by:

    1. Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2019. "Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    2. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Mark Koyama & Youhong Lin & Tuan-Hwee Sng, 2023. "The Fractured-Land Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(2), pages 1173-1231.
    3. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2013. "Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 289-306.
    4. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev & Minarsch, David E.N., 2021. "The strategy of conquest," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. de Miguel-Arribas, A. & Morón-Vidal, J. & Floría, L.M. & Gracia-Lázaro, C. & Hernández, L. & Moreno, Y., 2024. "Contests in two fronts," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    6. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    7. Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2017. "Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001375, David K. Levine.
    8. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Marcos-Prieto, Pablo, 2024. "Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    9. Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    10. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • A0 - General Economics and Teaching - - General
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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