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Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

Author

Listed:
  • David K. Levine
  • Salvatore Modica
  • Federico Weinschelbaum
  • Felipe Zurita

Abstract

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a twopopulation example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.

Suggested Citation

  • David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2011. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Documentos de Trabajo 397, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:397
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2012. "Conflict and the evolution of societies," Working Papers 2012-032, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    2. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000692, David K. Levine.
    3. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2013. "Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 289-306.
    4. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2016. "An Evolutionary Model of Intervention and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001391, UCLA Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Impatience; evolution;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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