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Credit access and relational contracts: An experiment testing informational and contractual frictions for Pakistani farmers

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https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/credit-access-and-relational-contracts.htm

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  • M. Ali Choudhary & Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Credit access and relational contracts: An experiment testing informational and contractual frictions for Pakistani farmers," International Finance Discussion Papers 2022, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:2022
    DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2022.1363
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    enforcement; credit markets; contracts; screening; banks; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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