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Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

Author

Listed:
  • Pushkar Maitra

    (Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton Campus, VIC 3800, Australia.)

  • Sandip Mitra

    (Sampling and Official Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B.T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.)

  • Dilip Mookherjee

    (Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA.)

  • Sujata Visaria

    (Department of Economics, Lee Shau Kee Business Building, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.)

Abstract

We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers’ farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Pushkar Maitra & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2020. "Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2020-70, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Jan 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:hku:wpaper:202070
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    Cited by:

    1. Deserranno, Erika & Bandiera, Oriana & Rasul, Imran, 2020. "Development Policy through the Lens of Social Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 14876, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Emerick, Kyle & De Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Dar, Manzoor & Wiseman, Eleanor, 2020. "Private Input Suppliers as Information Agents for Technology Adoption in Agriculture," CEPR Discussion Papers 15584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Oriana Bandiera & Robin Burgess & Erika Deserranno & Ricardo Morel & Munshi Sulaiman & Imran Rasul, 2023. "Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 162-224.
    4. Pushkar Maitra & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2021. "Evaluating the Distributive Effects of a Development Intervention," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202106, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    5. M. Ali Choudhary & Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Credit access and relational contracts: An experiment testing informational and contractual frictions for Pakistani farmers," International Finance Discussion Papers 2022, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    7. Maitra, Pushkar & Mitra, Sandip & Mookherjee, Dilip & Visaria, Sujata, 2022. "Evaluating the distributive effects of a micro-credit intervention," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    8. Oriana Bandiera & Robin Burgess & Erika Deserranno & Ricardo Morel & Imran Rasul & Munshi Sulaiman & Jack Thiemel, 2022. "Microfinance and Diversification," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(S1), pages 239-275, June.
    9. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Targeting; Intermediation; Decentralization; Community Driven Development; Agricultural Credit; Networks JEL: H42; I38; O13; O16; O17;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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