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Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

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  • Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
  • Pastorino, Elena

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.

Suggested Citation

  • Camargo, Bráz Ministério de & Pastorino, Elena, 2010. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment," Textos para discussão 219, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:eesptd:219
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. O'Flaherty, Brendan & Siow, Aloysius, 1995. "Up-or-Out Rules in the Market for Lawyers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 709-735, October.
    2. Brendan O'Flaherty & Aloysius Siow, 1992. "On the Job Screening, up or out Rules, and Firm Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 346-368, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caroline D. Thomas, 2021. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-82, February.

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