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Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental Evaluation

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  • Gastón Giordana

    (LAMETA, Université Montpellier I)

  • Marc Willinger

    (LAMETA, Université Montpellier I)

Abstract

We evaluate the effectiveness of non optimal and temporally inconsistent incentive policies for regulating the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The corresponding game is an N-person discrete-time deterministic dynamic game of T periods fixed duration. Three policy instruments with parameters that remain constant for the whole horizon are evaluated: a pigouvian tax (flat tax), an ambient tax (ambient flat tax) and an instrument combining the two previous ones (mixed flat instrument). We test in the lab the predictions of the model solved for 3 distinct behavioural assumptions: (a) sub-game perfection, (b) myopic behaviour, and (c) joint payoff maximization. We find that subjects behave myopically in the unregulated situation, which agrees with previous results in the literature. Conditional on predictions, the mixed flat instrument and the flat tax are the most effective policies in approaching the optimum extraction path. However, in absolute terms the ambient flat tax and the mixed flat instrument curb most significantly the mean extraction path towards the optimum path. Paradoxically, these instruments are the less efficient ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Gastón Giordana & Marc Willinger, 2007. "Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental Evaluation," Working Papers 2007.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.72
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Ambec & Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Carine Sebi, 2009. "Règlementation acceptable d’une ressource commune : une analyse expérimentale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 190(4), pages 107-122.
    2. Stefan Ambec & Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Arnaud Reynaud & Carine Sebi, 2014. "Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(2), pages 219-244, June.
    3. Gastón A. Giordana, 2008. "Wealthy people do better? Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Time Preference Heterogeneity and the Effect of Wealth in Renewable Common-Pool Resources Exploitation," Working Papers 08-10, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jul 2008.
    4. Jörg Spiller & Friedel Bolle, 2013. "Inter-Generational Thoughtfulness in a Dynamic Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 008, RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy Instruments; Renewable Common-pool Resources; Dynamic Externalities; Experimental Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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