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Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation

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  • Ambec, Stefan
  • Garapin, Alexis
  • Muller, Laurent
  • Reynaud, Arnaud
  • Sebi, Carine

Abstract

We test in a laboratory experiment three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. Theory predicts that they all reduce resource use from free access to the same target level without hurting users. We find that all regulations perform equally in reducing resources, although with more variance under the fee scheme. All fail to make all the users better off. The fee scheme performs better than transferable quotas in sorting out the most efficient users but at the cost of hurting them more often.

Suggested Citation

  • Ambec, Stefan & Garapin, Alexis & Muller, Laurent & Reynaud, Arnaud & Sebi, Carine, 2009. "Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation," TSE Working Papers 09-100, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:22203
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    2. Jakob, Michael & Kübler, Dorothea & Steckel, Jan Christoph & van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2017. "Clean up your own mess: An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 138-146.

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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