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Economic Voting in Britain, 1857-1914

Author

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  • Robert Hodgson

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • John Maloney

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

Abstract

Despite limited government control over the pre-1914 economy, opposition politicians were enthusiastic in blaming bad economic news on the incumbent. In a study of 458 by-elections between 1857 and 1914, we find that voters typically gave new governments a 'honeymoon' but thereafter held them responsible for high unemployment and high prices. Each 1% rise in the price level, on average, brought about a 0.21% swing against the government of the day, while each one-point rise in the percentage unemployed had double this effect. Attributing shorter- or longer-term memories to voters, as they used the past to determine what constituted unacceptable price and unemployment levels, makes little difference to this result. We also look at grievance asymmetry - the idea that voters give governments more blame for bad outcomes than they give credit for good ones - and find some evidence in its favour.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Hodgson & John Maloney, 2010. "Economic Voting in Britain, 1857-1914," Discussion Papers 1009, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1009
    as

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    File URL: https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1009.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henrik Jordahl, 2006. "An economic analysis of voting in Sweden," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 251-265, June.
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    3. Irwin, Douglas A, 1994. "The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 75-108, April.
    4. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1997. "The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986-1992," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 81-99, February.
    5. Bloom, Howard S. & Price, H. Douglas, 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1240-1254, December.
    6. John Maloney, 2005. "The Political Economy of Robert Lowe," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-50404-2, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; inflation unemplyment; Britian; elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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