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How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Rousseau Sandra

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies)

  • Billiet Carole

    (Center for environmental law - University of Ghent)

Abstract

We build a structural model to understand the fine set in court, which is described as the outcome of a two-stage game between defendant, public prosecutor and judge. The equilibrium fine depends on the harm caused, the costs to society and the probalility that the quilty party is punished. This fine influences the severity of prosecution and the defence expenditures. Next we empirically analyse the fines pronounced by the Court of Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) for water related criminal offences. We investigate whether the seriousness of the violation and past convictions, as well as some other characteristics, increase the penalty.

Suggested Citation

  • Rousseau Sandra & Billiet Carole, 2005. "How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0510, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0510
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
    2. Steven Shavell, 2004. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Deily, Mary E. & Gray, Wayne B., 1991. "Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 260-274, November.
    4. Helland, Eric, 2001. "Prosecutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence on Litigation Strategy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 271-294, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    2. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.

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