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Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

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  • Sandra Rousseau

Abstract

Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:17-36
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9013-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kjetil Telle, 2009. "The threat of regulatory environmental inspection: impact on plant performance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 154-178, April.
    2. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    3. Rousseau Sandra, 2005. "The use of warnings when intended and measured emissions differ," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0508, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    4. Rousseau Sandra, 2007. "The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms’ Environmental Compliance Decisions," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0704, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    5. Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Taxes, Permits, and the Adoptation of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-20-efd, Resources for the Future.
    6. Suvrat S. Dhanorkar & Enno Siemsen & Kevin W. Linderman, 2018. "Promoting Change from the Outside: Directing Managerial Attention in the Implementation of Environmental Improvements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2535-2556, June.
    7. D'Amato, Alessio & Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Nicolli, Francesco & Zoli, Mariangela, 2018. "Illegal waste disposal: Enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 56-65.
    8. Herzing, Mathias, 2021. "Multiple equilibria in the context of inspection probabilities depending on firms’ relative emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
    10. Jessica Coria & Xiao-Bing Zhang, 2015. "State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 359-381, October.
    11. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2010. "Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes," Working Papers in Economics 455, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    12. Jessica Coria & Clara Villegas-Palacio, 2014. "Regulatory Dealing: Technology Adoption Versus Enforcement Stringency Of Emission Taxes," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 451-473, April.
    13. Kjetil Telle, 2012. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway," Discussion Papers 680, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    14. Sarah Stafford, 2013. "How predictable are environmental compliance inspections?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 361-388, December.
    15. Rousseau, Sandra & Telle, Kjetil, 2010. "On the existence of the optimal fine for environmental crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 329-337, December.
    16. Carole M. Billiet & Thomas Blondiau & Sandra Rousseau, 2014. "Punishing environmental crimes: An empirical study from lower courts to the court of appeal," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 472-496, December.
    17. Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    18. Telle, Kjetil, 2013. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 24-34.
    19. Jay P. Shimshack, 2014. "The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 339-360, October.
    20. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The use of warnings in the presence of errors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 191-201, September.
    21. Gupta, Shreekant & Saksena, Shalini & Baris, Omer F., 2019. "Environmental enforcement and compliance in developing countries: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 313-327.
    22. Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2014. "High Priority Violation Policy and Targeting Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis of its Effectiveness and Efficiency," Working Papers 1411, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement; Survival analysis; Textile industry; K42 Illegal behavior and the enforcement of law; Q53 Water pollution; C41 Survival analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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