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Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay
  • Shepsle, Kenneth

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institutionalized within an organization’s structure, and, given the focus of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our analysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the number of periods each player participates is endogenously determined by his or her past performance. We derive several results and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and (ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with suboptimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is allocated to the oldest generation of players.

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay & Shepsle, Kenneth, 2003. "Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players," Economics Discussion Papers 8856, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:8856
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    File URL: https://repository.essex.ac.uk/8856/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
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    3. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2004. "Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 383-411, April.
    4. V. Bhaskar, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 135-149.
    5. Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Seniority in Legislature," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Diermeier, Daniel, 1995. "Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 344-355, June.
    7. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. John M. de Figueiredo, 2004. "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," NBER Working Papers 10588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. John de Figueiredo, "undated". "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1082, American Law & Economics Association.
    3. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Conconi, Paola, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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