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Myanmar: Cross-Cutting Governance Challenges

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  • Cullen Hendrix
  • Marcus Noland

Abstract

The paper assesses the current status of governance institutions in Myanmar, as well as their performance, in comparison to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and selected other countries. Specifically, the paper discusses outstanding problem areas related to economic governance, particularly in the legal system, the business regulatory framework, and in bureaucratic capacity as well as the potential use of external policy anchors, particularly in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, to strengthen Myanmar’s ongoing reform effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Cullen Hendrix & Marcus Noland, 2015. "Myanmar: Cross-Cutting Governance Challenges," Working Papers id:6676, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:6676
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    6. Givens, David, 2013. "Defining governance matters: A factor analytic assessment of governance institutions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 1026-1053.
    7. Cullen S. Hendrix & Marcus Noland, 2014. "Confronting the Curse: The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural Resource Governance," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 6765, January.
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    16. Susan Ariel Aaronson & Jennifer Brinkerhoff, 2009. "Limited Partnership: Business, Government, Civil Society (NGOs) and the Public in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)," Working Papers 2010-28, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
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    Cited by:

    1. Soans, Aaron & Abe, Masato, 2016. "Bribery, corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 41-56.
    2. Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus, 2016. "Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 105812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ralf Barkemeyer & Jason Miklian, 2019. "Responsible Business in Fragile Contexts: Comparing Perceptions from Domestic and Foreign Firms in Myanmar," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-18, January.
    4. Cullen S. Hendrix & Marcus Noland, 2014. "Managing Myanmar's Resource Boom to Lock in Reforms," Policy Briefs PB14-11, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Myanmar; governance; economic reform; peace process; property rights; resource curse; institutions; ASEAN; external policy; EITI; challenges.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P28 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Natural Resources; Environment
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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