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Large Farmers In The Lease Market : How and Why Do They Enter the Market? Are Marginal Farmers Affected in the Process?

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  • C. S Murty

Abstract

The paper revolves around the necessity to rid the large tenant of the lease market in the interest of the poor peasant, who yearns to lease-in a piece of land. The notion that the petty peasant is opting out of the lease market because of costliness of new technology seems unfounded. The peasant is not opting out, rather the large farmer is forcing him to withdraw from the market by appealing to the need of his lessor for secure rental receipts and by paying him rent in fixed cash. It is in the interest of the large farmer to drive out the petty cultivator from the lease market and thereby gain control over it, because mechanization of farming operations, in the context of high wages, is making heavy demands on him to expand the size of his operational holding. With the scope to enlarge the ownership holding having decreased, more because of the deterrent effect of the land ceiling laws, the large farmer has no option but to lease-in land to expand the size of holding to put his capital assets to optimum use. Large farmers may contribute to capitalist development in agriculture. But development of capitalist relations may lead to proletarianisation of large sections of the rural working classes.[CESS WP NO 55]

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  • C. S Murty, 2009. "Large Farmers In The Lease Market : How and Why Do They Enter the Market? Are Marginal Farmers Affected in the Process?," Working Papers id:2008, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bliss, C. J. & Stern, N. H., 1982. "Palanpur: The Economy of an Indian Village," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198284192.
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    Keywords

    Marginal Farmers; tenancy laws; NSS Data; Holdings; Large Farmers;
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