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Does the mixture of policy instruments matter? An empirical test of government support for the private provision of public goods

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  • Mulder, A.

Abstract

Governments wishing to encourage the private sector provision of a public good can choose amongst a wide variety of economic instruments. This paper analyses how governments in the EU(15) countries have succeeded in stimulating investment in wind turbines between 1985 and 2000, using national laws and decrees, IEA/OECD data on wind turbines, and one hypothetical investment project to calculate Tobin's Q. The main question addressed is whether the portfolio of policy instruments matters, or whether government support for the private provision of a public good is a matter of a pecuniary transferral.

Suggested Citation

  • Mulder, A., 2004. "Does the mixture of policy instruments matter? An empirical test of government support for the private provision of public goods," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-073-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:1585
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tobin's Q; fiscal investment incentives; private provision of public goods; renewable energy; subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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