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Graph value for cooperative games

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  • Hellman, Ziv
  • Peretz, Ron

Abstract

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.

Suggested Citation

  • Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron, 2013. "Graph value for cooperative games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50073, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:50073
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50073/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley value; network games;

    JEL classification:

    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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