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The changing and growing roles of independent central banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate

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  • Goodhart, Charles
  • Lastra, Rosa

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse why the changing and growing roles of independent Central Banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, Charles & Lastra, Rosa, 2023. "The changing and growing roles of independent central banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118448
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118448/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Blanchard, 2019. "Public Debt and Low Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1197-1229, April.
    2. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    accountability; central banking; financial stability; independence; monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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