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Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World: An Extended Dataset

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  • Garriga, Ana Carolina

Abstract

How has central bank independence (CBI) changed over time and across countries? This paper introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure CBI, including country-year observations covering 192 countries between 1970 and 2023. The dataset identifies statutory reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and codes four dimensions of CBI (personnel independence, central bank’s objectives, policy formulation, and limits on lending). It includes two CBI indices and a regional diffusion variable. The broader coverage of this dataset has important implications. First, although this dataset coding decisions are generally consistent with previous research, countries included only in this dataset tend to have lower CBI and differ in other dimensions with those previously coded. This suggests that systematically missing data in other data sources may have effects on inferences. Second, extended temporal coverage allows analyzing the evolution of central bank governance for more than a decade since the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, the data show that although there is a global tendency towards more CBI, there is significant variance across and within regions, including numerous reforms reducing CBI in the past two decades. This data contribution is important for research beyond the study of monetary institutions and their effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World: An Extended Dataset," MPRA Paper 123578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Central banks; Data; Delegation; Global Financial Crisis; Great Moderation; Reforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • Y10 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Data: Tables and Charts - - - Data: Tables and Charts

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