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Future imperfect: behavioural economics and government paternalism

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  • Le Grand, Julian

Abstract

Economists and others have used the results from behavioral economics to justify paternalistic government policies, aimed at changing an individual’s behavior in the present so as to improve that individual’s well-being in the future. Examples include the automatic enrollment in pension schemes and anti-smoking measures, such as banning smoking in public places or proposals for a smoking license. But these - and the economic analyses underlying them – have been challenged on the grounds that they arbitrarily privilege one set of preferences over another. The privileged preferences include those of an ‘inner rational agent’ and those of the future over the present. This paper addresses this criticism and puts forward two new conceptions of - and justifications for – these kinds of policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Grand, Julian, 2018. "Future imperfect: behavioural economics and government paternalism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102575, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:102575
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102575/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    2. Hausman, Daniel M., 2018. "Efficacious and Ethical Public Paternalism," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 5(3-4), pages 261-280, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Krügel & Matthias Uhl, 2023. "The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(4), pages 817-833, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    behavioral economics; government paternalism;

    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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