IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/een/camaaa/2020-57.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Time inconsistency and endogenous borrowing constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Joydeep Bhattacharya
  • Monisankar Bishnu
  • Min Wang

Abstract

This paper studies the welfare of time-inconsistent, partially sophisticated agents living under two different regimes, one with complete, unfettered credit markets (CM) and the other with endogenous borrowing constraints (EBC) where the borrowing limits are set to make agents indifferent between defaulting and paying back their unsecured loans. The CM regime cannot deliver the first best because partially sophisticated agents would undo plans laid out by previous selves and borrow too much. Somewhat counterintuitively, in some cases, the EBC regime may deliver higher welfare than the CM regime. These results speak to the academic debate surrounding the creation and functioning of the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) in the U.S. and its implementation of the ability-to-repay rule on lenders after the 2007-8 crisis. Such institutions generate commitment publicly and may help time inconsistent agents economize on the costs of private commitment provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Joydeep Bhattacharya & Monisankar Bishnu & Min Wang, 2020. "Time inconsistency and endogenous borrowing constraints," CAMA Working Papers 2020-57, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2020-57
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/2020-06/57_2020_bhattacharya_bishnu_wang.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice and Procrastination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 121-160.
    2. Nicolas Coeurdacier & Stéphane Guibaud & Keyu Jin, 2015. "Credit Constraints and Growth in a Global Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2838-2881, September.
    3. Scott Fay & Erik Hurst & Michelle J. White, 2002. "The Household Bankruptcy Decision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 706-718, June.
    4. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    5. Zhang, Harold H, 1997. "Endogenous Borrowing Constraints with Incomplete Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2187-2209, December.
    6. Nakajima, Makoto, 2017. "Assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 42-64.
    7. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    8. Salanie, Francois & Treich, Nicolas, 2006. "Over-savings and hyperbolic discounting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1557-1570, August.
    9. David Andolfatto & Martin Gervais, 2006. "Human Capital Investment and Debt Constraints," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(1), pages 52-67, January.
    10. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    11. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    12. Bishnu, Monisankar & Garg, Shresth & Garg, Tishara & Ray, Tridip, 2021. "Optimal intergenerational transfers: Public education and pensions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    13. Luttmer, Erzo G.J. & Mariotti, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 493-506, January.
    14. Christopher Mayer & Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski & Arpit Gupta, 2014. "Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2830-2857, September.
    15. Krueger, Dirk & Perri, Fabrizio, 2011. "Public versus private risk sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 920-956, May.
    16. Botond Köszegi, 2014. "Behavioral Contract Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1075-1118, December.
    17. Bechlioulis, Alexandros P. & Brissimis, Sophocles N., 2019. "Consumer debt non-payment and the borrowing constraint: Implications for consumer behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 161-172.
    18. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    19. Min Wang, 2014. "Optimal education policies under endogenous borrowing constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 135-159, January.
    20. Bishnu, Monisankar, 2013. "Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 720-742.
    21. Paul Heidhues & Botond Koszegi, 2010. "Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2279-2303, December.
    22. Michelle J. White, 2007. "Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 175-200, Fall.
    23. Costas Azariadis & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Endogenous Debt Constraints in Lifecycle Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 461-487.
    24. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    25. Del Rey, Elena & Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel, 2020. "On government-created credit markets for education and endogenous growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 170-179.
    26. Ryan, Andrea & Trumbull, Gunnar & Tufano, Peter, 2011. "A Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 461-498, October.
    27. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    28. Michelle J. White, 2007. "Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards," NBER Working Papers 13265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/169d87l3e88rpoi5e1tgckfi6a is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Guo, Nick L. & Caliendo, Frank N., 2014. "Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 102-108.
    31. Liya Liu & Yingjie Niu & Yuanping Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2020. "Optimal consumption with time-inconsistent preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 785-815, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Bishnu, Monisankar & Wang, Min, 2023. "Credit Markets with Time-Inconsistent Agents and Strategic Loan Default," ISU General Staff Papers 202004030700001100, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Azariadis, Costas & Kaas, Leo, 2013. "Endogenous credit limits with small default costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 806-824.
    3. Eduardo Dávila, 2020. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Bankruptcy Exemptions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 870-913.
    4. Christian A. Stoltenberg & Swapnil Singh, 2020. "Consumption insurance with advance information," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 671-711, May.
    5. Broer, Tobias, 2020. "Consumption insurance over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 14579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Igor Livshits, 2015. "Recent Developments In Consumer Credit And Default Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 594-613, September.
    7. Paul Calcott & Vladimir Petkov, 2022. "Excessive consumption and present bias," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 113-134, July.
    8. Gente, Karine & León-Ledesma, Miguel A. & Nourry, Carine, 2015. "External constraints and endogenous growth: Why didn't some countries benefit from capital flows?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 223-249.
    9. Nakajima, Makoto, 2017. "Assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 42-64.
    10. Viktar Fedaseyeu, 2012. "Debt Collection Agencies and the Supply of Consumer Credit," Working Papers 442, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    11. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2020. "Risk sharing with private and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    12. Gordon, Grey, 2017. "Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 123-149.
    13. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    14. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Qiao, Xue & Wang, Min, 2016. "Endogenous Borrowing Constraints And Wealth Inequality," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(6), pages 1413-1431, September.
    15. Yu, Pei Cheng, 2020. "Seemingly exploitative contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 299-320.
    16. Minwook Kang, 2019. "Pareto-improving tax policies under hyperbolic discounting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 618-660, June.
    17. Piotr Denderski & Christian Stoltenberg, 2015. "On Positive Value of Information in Risk Sharing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-074/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," Working Papers 1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    19. Gao, Feng & Xi He, Alex & He, Ping, 2018. "A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 70-100.
    20. Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    endogenous borrowing constraints; overborrowing; financial protection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E70 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • G40 - Financial Economics - - Behavioral Finance - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2020-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cama Admin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/asanuau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.