IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v51y2014icp102-108.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies

Author

Listed:
  • Guo, Nick L.
  • Caliendo, Frank N.

Abstract

Social security is commonly viewed as a commitment device for hyperbolic consumers. We argue that such common intuition is not consistent with formal economic theory. In a model where the government can choose either time-consistent or time-inconsistent policies to govern its social security arrangement and credit markets are complete, only a time-inconsistent policy achieves true commitment by hyperbolic consumers. This rules out a traditional social security program as a commitment device.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Nick L. & Caliendo, Frank N., 2014. "Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 102-108.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:51:y:2014:i:c:p:102-108
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406814000111
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2011. "Myopia, redistribution and pensions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 165-175, February.
    2. Steven J. Davis & Felix Kubler & Paul Willen, 2006. "Borrowing Costs and the Demand for Equity over the Life Cycle," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(2), pages 348-362, May.
    3. R. A. Pollak, 1968. "Consistent Planning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(2), pages 201-208.
    4. Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1989. "On the Contribution of Economics to the Evaluation and Formation of Social Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 184-190, May.
    5. David Laibson & Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, 2005. "Estimating Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000643, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Caliendo, Frank N., 2011. "Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 668-675, May.
    7. Homburg, Stefan, 2000. "Compulsory savings in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 233-239, August.
    8. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2011. "On myopia as rationale for social security," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 135-158, May.
    9. Per Krusell & Anthony A. Smith, Jr., 2003. "Consumption--Savings Decisions with Quasi--Geometric Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 365-375, January.
    10. Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu & Douglas H. Joines, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 745-784.
    11. Hurst, Erik & Willen, Paul, 2007. "Social security and unsecured debt," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1273-1297, August.
    12. Frank Caliendo & T. Findley, 2013. "Limited computational ability and social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 414-433, June.
    13. T. Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2008. "The behavioral justification for public pensions: a survey," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 32(4), pages 409-425, October.
    14. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1996. "Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 33-54, July.
    15. Bucciol, Alessandro, 2011. "A Note On Social Security Welfare With Self-Control Problems," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 579-594, September.
    16. Helmuth Cremer & Philippe Donder & Dario Maldonado & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(5), pages 547-562, October.
    17. Karp, Larry, 2007. "Non-constant discounting in continuous time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 557-568, January.
    18. Stefan Homburg, 2006. "Coping with Rational Prodigals: A Theory of Social Security and Savings Subsidies," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(289), pages 47-58, February.
    19. T. Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2009. "Short horizons, time inconsistency, and optimal social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(4), pages 487-513, August.
    20. Martin Feldstein, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(2), pages 303-320.
    21. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    22. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 1987. "Justifying Public Provision of Social Security," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 674-696.
    23. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Self Control, Revealed Preferences and Consumption Choice," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(2), pages 243-264, April.
    24. B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009. "Behavioral Welfare Economics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 267-319, 04-05.
    25. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    26. Diamond, Peter & Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1839-1872, September.
    27. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2009. "Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 51-104.
    28. Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 513-526, June.
    29. Kumru, Çagri S. & Thanopoulos, Athanasios C., 2008. "Social security and self control preferences," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 757-778, March.
    30. Docquier, Frederic, 2002. "On the optimality of public pensions in an economy with life-cyclers and myopes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 121-140, January.
    31. Caliendo, Frank N. & Guo, Nick L., 2014. "Roosevelt And Prescott Come To An Agreement," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 1383-1402, September.
    32. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2007. "Toward Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 464-470, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    2. Minwook Kang, 2019. "Pareto-improving tax policies under hyperbolic discounting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 618-660, June.
    3. Hiraguchi, Ryoji, 2016. "On a two-sector endogenous growth model with quasi-geometric discounting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 26-35.
    4. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Monisankar Bishnu & Min Wang, 2023. "Credit Markets with time-inconsistent agents and strategic loan default," Discussion Papers 23-01, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Erin Cottle Hunt & Frank N. Caliendo, 2022. "Social security and risk sharing: A survey of four decades of economic analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5), pages 1591-1609, December.
    2. Frank N. Caliendo & T. Scott Findley, 2020. "Myopia, education, and social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 694-720, June.
    3. Caliendo, Frank N. & Findley, T. Scott, 2019. "Commitment and welfare," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 210-234.
    4. Kang, Minwook & Kim, Eungsik, 2023. "A government policy with time-inconsistent consumers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 44-67.
    5. Caliendo, Frank N. & Guo, Nick L., 2014. "Roosevelt And Prescott Come To An Agreement," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 1383-1402, September.
    6. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2011. "Myopia, redistribution and pensions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 165-175, February.
    7. Frank Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2013. "Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 37(3), pages 375-401, July.
    8. Driscoll, John C. & Holden, Steinar, 2014. "Behavioral economics and macroeconomic models," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 133-147.
    9. Hurst, Erik & Willen, Paul, 2007. "Social security and unsecured debt," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1273-1297, August.
    10. Caliendo, Frank N., 2011. "Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 668-675, May.
    11. Tyrowicz, Joanna, 2020. "Are incentivized old-age savings schemes effective under incomplete rationality?," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224526, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Joanna Tyrowicz & Krzysztof Makarski & Artur Rutkowski, 2020. "Fiscal incentives to pension savings – are they efficient?," Working Paper series 20-06, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    13. T. Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2009. "Short horizons, time inconsistency, and optimal social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(4), pages 487-513, August.
    14. Nakajima, Makoto, 2017. "Assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 42-64.
    15. Chu-chuan Cheng & Hsun Chu, 2018. "Optimal policies for sin goods and health care: Tax or subsidy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 412-429, April.
    16. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    17. Kumru, Cagri S. & Tran, Chung, 2012. "Temptation and social security in a dynastic framework," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 1422-1445.
    18. Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv, 2017. "Collective Self-Control," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 213-244, August.
    19. Minwook Kang, 2019. "Pareto-improving tax policies under hyperbolic discounting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 618-660, June.
    20. Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006. "Commitment vs. Flexibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:51:y:2014:i:c:p:102-108. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.