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Self-Selection Consistent Choices

Author

Listed:
  • Salvador Barbera

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

  • Carmen Bevia

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barbera & Carmen Bevia, 2000. "Self-Selection Consistent Choices," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1322, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.
    2. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    3. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 18-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Common Decision Scheme," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1077, Econometric Society.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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