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Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions

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  • Norman,P.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

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  • Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    5. James A. Dearden, 1998. "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 189-198.
    6. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    7. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    8. Dreze, Jacques H., 1980. "Public goods with exclusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 5-24, February.
    9. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
    10. Brito, Dagobert L & Oakland, William H, 1980. "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 691-704, September.
    11. Cornelli, Francesca, 1996. "Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-30, October.
    12. Pesendorfer, Martin, 1998. "Pollution Claim Settlements under Correlated Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 72-105, March.
    13. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    14. Zvika Neeman, 1999. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 679-691.
    15. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 369-380.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
    2. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    3. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
    4. Simona Grassi & Ching‐To Albert Ma, 2012. "Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 1-34, February.
    5. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
    6. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Martin F. Hellwig, 2010. "Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 361-397, September.
    8. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
    9. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1511R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
    10. Sahm, Marco, 2006. "Essays in Public Economic Theory," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5633, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Martin Hellwig & Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Public Good Provision in a Large Economy," 2009 Meeting Papers 1062, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Ellingsen, Tore & Paltseva, Elena, 2012. "The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 658-669.
    14. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2008. "Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    15. Felix Bierbrauer, 2010. "An incomplete contracts perspective on the provision and pricing of excludable public goods," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    16. Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    17. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," Working Papers 2009.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and public-sector pricing : a contribution to the foundations of public economics," Papers 04-42, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    19. Gailmard, Sean & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2005. "An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1361-1398, August.
    20. Bierbrauer, Felix, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 265, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    21. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 2663, CESifo.
    22. Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614.

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