Performance Improvement and Performance Dysfunction: An Empirical Examination of Impacts of the Emergency Room Wait-Time Target in the English National Health Service
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- Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2004.
"An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives,"
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- Matt Sutton & Ross Elder & Bruce Guthrie & Graham Watt, 2010. "Record rewards: the effects of targeted quality incentives on the recording of risk factors by primary care providers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 1-13, January.
- Carl Deschamps & Jan Mattijs, 2015. "Anatomy of a performance management system: the elusive path from targets to productivity," Working Papers CEB 15-037, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Propper, Carol & Sutton, Matt & Whitnall, Carolyn & Windmeijer, Frank, 2010.
"Incentives and targets in hospital care: Evidence from a natural experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 318-335, April.
- Carol Propper & Matt Sutton & Carolyn Whitnall & Frank Windmeijer, 2008. "Incentives and Targets in Hospital Care: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/205, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Kelman, Steven J. & Myers, Jeff, 2009. "Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government: An Empirical Analysis," Scholarly Articles 4481609, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Gwyn Bevan & Richard Hamblin, 2009. "Hitting and missing targets by ambulance services for emergency calls: effects of different systems of performance measurement within the UK," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 172(1), pages 161-190, January.
- Alexander Kroll & Dominik Vogel, 2013. "Prosocial Attitudes in the Public and Private Sector: Exploring Behavioral Effects and Variation across Time," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 578, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
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