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Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?

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  • Bohnet, Iris

    (Harvard U)

  • Cooter, Robert

    (U of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Besides deterring people, laws may affect behavior by changing preferences or beliefs. A law may elicit intrinsic motivation by framing an act as wrong. Alternatively, it may coordinate the behavior of different people by changing their beliefs about what others will do. We investigate framing and coordination effects experimentally in prisoner's dilemma, "crowding" and coordination games. We simulate a law by imposing a probabilistic penalty on one of the choices. In the prisoner's dilemma and the crowding game, announcing the penalty had no effect. In the coordination game, announcing the penalty caused behavior to jump to the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Keywords: Equilibrium selection, framing, expressive law, experiments, coordination, prisoner's dilemma

Suggested Citation

  • Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2003. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Working Paper Series rwp03-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-046
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    3. Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2005. "Auszeichnungen: Ein Vernachl�ssigter Anreiz," IEW - Working Papers 254, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Niels Petersen, 2009. "Rational Choice or Deliberation? Customary International Law between Coordination and Constitutionalization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 71-85, March.
    5. Carbonara Emanuela & Parisi Francesco & von Wangenheim Georg, 2008. "Lawmakers as Norm Entrepreneurs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 779-799, December.
    6. Fluet, Claude & Galbiati, Rpbertp, 2016. "Lois et normes : les enseignements de l'économie comportementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 191-215, Mars-Juin.
    7. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    8. Daniel Arce & Sneha Bakshi & Rachel Croson & Catherine Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Malcolm Kass, 2011. "Counterterrorism strategies in the lab," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 465-478, December.
    9. Sun, Huojun & Bigoni, Maria, 2018. "A fine rule from a brutish world? An experiment on endogenous punishment institution and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 158-169.
    10. Leonard Hoeft & Michael Kurschilgen & Wladislaw Mill & Simone Vannuccini, 2022. "Norms as Obligations," Munich Papers in Political Economy 22, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    11. Renate Buijze & Christoph Engel & Sigrid Hemels, 2015. "Insuring Your Donation – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jul 2016.
    12. Licht Amir N., 2008. "Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 715-750, December.
    13. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
    14. Romaniuc Rustam, 2016. "What Makes Law to Change Behavior? An Experimental Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 447-475, July.
    15. Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, "undated". "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    16. Galbiati, Roberto & Schlag, Karl H. & van der Weele, Joël J., 2013. "Sanctions that signal: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 34-51.
    17. Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2006. "Auszeichnungen: Ein vernachlässigter Anreiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(2), pages 271-284, May.
    18. Carbonara, Emanuela & Parisi, Francesco & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2012. "Unjust laws and illegal norms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 285-299.
    19. Christoph Engel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_32, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    20. van der Weele Joël, 2012. "Beyond the State of Nature: Introducing Social Interactions in the Economic Model of Crime," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 401-432, October.
    21. Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, 2005. "Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third‐Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(1), pages 87-123, March.
    22. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2009. "Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment," Economics Working Papers 1150, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    23. Richard H. McAdams, 2011. "The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law," Chapters, in: Francesco Parisi (ed.), Production of Legal Rules, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    24. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    equilibrium selection; framing; expressive law; experiments; coordination; prisoner's dilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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