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What are the main obstacles to hiring after recessions in Europe?

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  • Savšek, Simon

Abstract

This paper assesses the relative importance of perceived obstacles to hiring workers on a permanent basis faced by EU firms and studies how they depend on firm’s characteristics. Findings suggest that the main obstacles to hiring in Europe are high uncertainty, shortage of skilled labour, high payroll taxes, high wages and the risks associated with changes to labour laws. While negative (firm-level) demand and finance shocks negatively affect firms’ perceptions of obstacles to hiring, labour market structures and firms’/employees’ characteristics are also found significant. In particular, our analysis shows that firms employing a higher percentage of skilled, permanent and experienced workers report fewer hiring obstacles. In contrast, firms under collective wage bargaining arrangements seem to report these obstacles more often. However, there are also some specific obstacles to hiring where this is not the case, which suggests that firm-level characteristics should also be taken into account when designing labour market policies. Finally, our analysis provides further tentative evidence on the impacts of labour market reforms, which seem to have a potential to address impediments towards employment creation in the EU. JEL Classification: D22, J21, J24, J63

Suggested Citation

  • Savšek, Simon, 2018. "What are the main obstacles to hiring after recessions in Europe?," Working Paper Series 2153, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20182153
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2153.en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lyuboslav Kostov, 2020. "The impact of labor productivity on wages in the EU," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 146-158.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment; labour market; obstacles; structural reforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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