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Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games

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  • Matias Nuñez

    (University of Cergy-Pontoise, Paris, matias.nunez@u-cergy.fr)

Abstract

Approval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myerson’s Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in equilibrium under Approval Voting. Indeed, a ‘paradoxical’ example is provided where a candidate ranked first by more than half of the voters is not the Winner of the election.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Nuñez, 2010. "Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 64-84, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:64-84
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629809348268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "On the Benefits of Costly Voting," Economics Working Papers 0083, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    3. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
    4. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    5. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 89-114, January.
    6. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    2. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.

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