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Governance mechanisms for effective leadership: The case of Spain

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  • Ricart, Joan E.

    (IESE Business School)

  • Alvarez, Jose L.

    (IESE Business School)

  • Gallo, Miguel A.

    (IESE Business School)

Abstract

Most recent work on Boards of Directors has been focused on what can be considered best practices for effective governance in terms of roles, composition, process and style. Furthermore, this literature can be divided among very practically oriented managerial work, and more rigorous, theoretically based work. Most of the empirical research in this area has been centered on Anglo-Saxon countries. Some European countries, like Spain, have a very different governance tradition. Given this context, our present work pursues with three complementary objectives: 1. To ascertain the current status of governance practices in Spain. 2. To obtain evidence about which of these practices may be associated with effective governance. 3. To find out what factors account for the composition of General Managers’ compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricart, Joan E. & Alvarez, Jose L. & Gallo, Miguel A., 1998. "Governance mechanisms for effective leadership: The case of Spain," IESE Research Papers D/371, IESE Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0371
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    leadership; effective governance;

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