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Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

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  • Ryosuke Sakai
  • Shigehiro Serizawa

Abstract

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects," ISER Discussion Paper 1107, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1107
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    1. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    3. , & ,, 2015. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    4. Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008. "Vickrey allocation rule with income effect," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
    5. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.
    6. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-888, July.
    7. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    8. Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 633-663, October.
    9. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 1990. "The core of the matching game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 203-212, September.
    10. Hiroki Shinozaki & Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Guasi-Linearity," ISER Discussion Paper 1097, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    11. Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    12. Toyotaka Sakai, 2008. "Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 347-356, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuya Wakabayashi & Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2022. "A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects," ISER Discussion Paper 1161, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2021. "Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 211-223.
    3. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    4. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper 1116, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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