Report NEP-DES-2020-11-09

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects," ISER Discussion Paper 1107, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
• Yi-Chun Chen & Xiangqian Yang, 2020. "Information Design in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2010.08990, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020. "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper 1446, Economics Department, Queen's University.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Trine Tornøe Platz, 2020. "Decentralized Task Coordination," IFRO Working Paper 2020/11, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
• P'eter Bir'o & Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer & S'andor S'ov'ag'o, 2020. "The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence," Papers 2010.08631, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
• Xiaotie Deng & Ron Lavi & Tao Lin & Qi Qi & Wenwei Wang & Xiang Yan, 2020. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling," Papers 2010.05519, arXiv.org.
• Kai Hao Yang, 2020. "Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2258, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• Mario Vazquez Corte, 2020. "A Model of Choice with Minimal Compromise," Papers 2010.08771, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.