Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Lavi, Ron & May, Marina, 2012. "A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 100-103.
- Josué Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2022.
"Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 969-988, November.
- Josue Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," Papers 1908.02988, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
- Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2019. "Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2020. "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," QBS Working Paper Series 2020/04, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008.
"Vickrey allocation rule with income effect,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0646, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Soo Chew & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2007.
"Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 393-406, November.
- Chew Soo Hong & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction," ISER Discussion Paper 0631, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985.
"The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-888, July.
- Gabrielle Demange & David Gale, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets," Post-Print halshs-00670994, HAL.
- Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Bonifacio, Agustín G., 2024.
"Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 12-24.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Papers 2210.11627, arXiv.org.
- Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4536, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules," Working Papers 191, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Pablo R. Arribillaga & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2023. "Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts," Working Papers 257, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Shengwu Li, 2017.
"Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
- Li, Shengwu, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 78930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-1144, September.
- Toyotaka Sakai, 2008. "Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 347-356, November.
- Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- , & ,, 2015.
"Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2012. "Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0852, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Marzena Rostek & Nathan Yoder, 2020. "Matching With Complementary Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1793-1827, September.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
- Baisa, Brian, 2017. "Auction design without quasilinear preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & E. Pepa Risma, 2023. "Obvious Manipulations in Matching without and with Contracts," Papers 2306.17773, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin, 2012. "A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 699-708.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2018.
"Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity,"
Discussion Papers
18-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Papers 2009.12114, arXiv.org.
- Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020.
"Mechanism design without quasilinearity,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," ISER Discussion Paper 1005, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 17-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-137, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper 1001, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.
- Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020. "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers e-21-008, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Working Papers e116, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Yuya Wakabayashi & Ryosuke Sakai & Hiroki Shinozaki, 2024. "Strategy-proof allocation problem with hard budget constraints and income effects: weak efficiency and fairness," OSIPP Discussion Paper 24E003, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
- Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0971, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016.
"Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 633-663, October.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2015. "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 0943, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023.
"Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 210-228.
- Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper 1116r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Nov 2022.
- Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
- Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020.
"Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, "undated". "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1001r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2020.
- Tsuyoshi Adachi & Takumi Kongo, 2013. "First-price auctions on general preference domains: axiomatic characterizations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 93-103, May.
- Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2022.
"A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems,"
International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 38-49, March.
- Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems," ISER Discussion Paper 1120, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
More about this item
Keywords
Non-obvious manipulations; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Non-quasi-linear utilities; Hard budget constraints; Package auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2024-01-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2024-01-15 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-136. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ashitjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.