Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1911-1929, May.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2018. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," CEPR Discussion Papers 12964, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
- Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D., 2020. "Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 454-477.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Revenue guarantee; Common values; Affiliated values; Revenue equivalence; Revenue ranking; First-price auction; Second-price auction; English auction;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2018-06-11 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2018-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2018-06-11 (Microeconomics)
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