Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests
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More about this item
Keywords
All-pay auctions; incomplete information; taxation; subsidies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-09-02 (Economic Design)
- NEP-PBE-2024-09-02 (Public Economics)
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