IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/werepe/37157.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Breaking the marriage trap: unilateral divorce and its effects on labor supply of married women

Author

Listed:
  • Pomares Varo, Gema

Abstract

We assess the impact of the 2005 divorce law reform in Spain, which reduced the time length and the costs of marriage termination, on the labor market outcomes of married women. We use independent cross sections of the Spanish Labor Force Survey between 2001 and 2009. As the reform affected married couples but not unmarried couples, we undertake a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the causal effect. Our results show that the reform substantially increased the participation and the occupation rates of married women by 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively, but reduced their average working hours by 5 percent. This latter result comes along with a large increase in part time employment due to the reform. The effects weremore pronounced for women without young children, with low education levels, and living in provinces where separate property was the default marital regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Pomares Varo, Gema, 2023. "Breaking the marriage trap: unilateral divorce and its effects on labor supply of married women," UC3M Working papers. Economics 37157, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:37157
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/3e1b86fd-e172-43d1-a92c-c47a40fbff97/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Betsey Stevenson, 2007. "The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 75-94.
    2. Hupkau, Claudia & Ruiz-Valenzuela, Jenifer, 2022. "Work and children in Spain: challenges and opportunities for equality between men and women," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112541, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, June.
    4. José G. Montalvo, 2011. "Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1146-1154, November.
    5. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
    6. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
    7. Pablo Brassiolo, 2016. "Domestic Violence and Divorce Law: When Divorce Threats Become Credible," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 443-477.
    8. Valeria Insarauto, 2021. "Women’s Vulnerability to the Economic Crisis through the Lens of Part-time Work in Spain," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 35(4), pages 621-639, August.
    9. Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December.
    10. Bargain, Olivier & González, Libertad & Keane, Claire & Özcan, Berkay, 2012. "Female labor supply and divorce: New evidence from Ireland," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1675-1691.
    11. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February.
    12. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    13. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-1187, December.
    14. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    15. Claudia Hupkau & Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2022. "Work and children in Spain: challenges and opportunities for equality between men and women," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 243-268, May.
    16. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chigavazira, Abraham & Fisher, Hayley & Robinson, Tim & Zhu, Anna, 2019. "The Consequences of Extending Equitable Property Division Divorce Laws to Cohabitants," IZA Discussion Papers 12102, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Pablo Brassiolo, 2016. "Domestic Violence and Divorce Law: When Divorce Threats Become Credible," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 443-477.
    3. Heggeness, Misty L., 2020. "Improving child welfare in middle income countries: The unintended consequence of a pro-homemaker divorce law and wait time to divorce," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    4. Corradini, Viola & Buccione, Giulia, 2023. "Unilateral divorce rights, domestic violence and women’s agency: Evidence from the Egyptian Khul reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, 2011. "Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 304-324, June.
    6. Hertegård, Edvin, 2024. "Divorce law reform, family stability, and children's long-term outcomes," Working Paper Series 2024:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    7. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Matrosova, Ksenia (Матросова, Ксения), 2018. "Development and Research of Economic Behavior of Households in Changing Conditions [Разработка И Исследование Экономического Поведения Домохозяйств В Изменяющихся Условиях]," Working Papers 041825, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    8. González, Libertad & Viitanen, Tarja K., 2009. "The effect of divorce laws on divorce rates in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 127-138, February.
    9. Frimmel, Wolfgang & Halla, Martin & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2024. "How does parental divorce affect children’s long-term outcomes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    10. Ho Lun Wong, 2021. "Effect of marriage registration on fertility and intrahousehold distribution in Thailand," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 312-338, August.
    11. Katie R. Genadek, 2018. "Unilateral Divorce and Time Allocation in the United States," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 63-87, January.
    12. François Cochard & Hélène Couprie & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2016. "Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-26, March.
    13. Nunley, John M. & Seals Jr., Richard Alan, 2011. "Child-custody reform, marital investment in children, and the labor supply of married mothers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 14-24, January.
    14. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    15. Bargain, Olivier & González, Libertad & Keane, Claire & Özcan, Berkay, 2012. "Female labor supply and divorce: New evidence from Ireland," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1675-1691.
    16. Daniela Vuri, 2018. "Joint custody law and mothers’ labor market outcomes: evidence from the USA," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 1203-1237, October.
    17. Akiko Maruyama & Takashi Shimizu & Kazuhiro Yamamoto, 2009. "Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-04, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    18. Gustavo J. Bobonis, 2011. "The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Marriage and Divorce," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 281-312.
    19. Martin Halla, 2013. "The Effect Of Joint Custody On Family Outcomes," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 278-315, April.
    20. Hoehn-Velasco, Lauren & Penglase, Jacob, 2021. "Does unilateral divorce impact women’s labor supply? Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 315-347.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:37157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.