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Does leadership in policy setting reduce pollution and make countries better off?

Author

Listed:
  • Ornella Tarola

    (DISSE, University of Rome La Sapienza, Rome, Italy)

  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

    (CNRS, CREST, Palaiseau, France)

Abstract

In light of the ongoing debate on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), we wonder whether it is worthwile for industrialized countries to take the lead in reducing emissions, rather than acting simultaneously with less advanced countries. To do this, we compare national payoffs and global emissions in each situation. We also examine whether industrial leakage is an inevitable outcome of asymmetric policies with differentiated abatement responsibilities and, if so, whether unambigously hurts the more industrialized countries. We show that leadership can improve payoffs while reducing global emissions, even though these goals appear to be at odds.

Suggested Citation

  • Ornella Tarola & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2024. "Does leadership in policy setting reduce pollution and make countries better off?," Working Papers 2024-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2024-11
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax Competition; Capital Integration; Global Pollution; Environmental agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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