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Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Balinski

    (CREST; CNRS; Ecole Polytechnique)

  • Rida Laraki

    (CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine; PSL; Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool)

Abstract

Majority judgment (MJ) and approval voting (AV) are compared in theory and practice. Criticisms of MJ and claims that AV is superior are refuted. The two primary criticisms have been that MJ is not "Condorcet-consistent" and that it admits the "no-show" paradox. That MJ is not Condorcet-consistent is a good property shared with AV: the domination paradox shows majority rule may well err in an election between two. Whereas the no-show paradox is in theory possible with MJ it is as a practical matter impossible. For those who believe this extremely rare phenomenon is important it is proven that MJ with three grades cannot admit the no-show paradox. In contrast; AV suffers from serious drawbacks because voters can only "tick" or "approve" candidates at best only Approve or Disapprove each candidate. With AV voters cannot express their opinions adequately; experiments show that Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove; and although AV does not admit the no-show paradox it admits the very closely allied "no-show syndrome and insensitivity." Two is too few. Substantive debate must concern three or more grades.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2018. "Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting," Working Papers 2018-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2018-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1621-1649, September.
    2. Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo, 2011. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 345-359.
    3. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud & Vestal Mcintyre, 2019. "Expressive voting and its costs," Post-Print halshs-02516426, HAL.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, September.
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    6. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, September.
    7. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, April.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harrie Swart, 2022. "How to Choose a President, Mayor, Chair: Balinski and Laraki Unpacked," The Mathematical Intelligencer, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 99-107, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority judgment; majority rule; approval voting; Condorcetconsistency; domination paradox; no-show paradox; no-show syndrome.;
    All these keywords.

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