Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ben Abramowitz & Nicholas Mattei, 2022. "Towards Group Learning: Distributed Weighting of Experts," Papers 2206.02566, arXiv.org.
- Ben Abramowitz & Omer Lev & Nicholas Mattei, 2022. "Who Reviews The Reviewers? A Multi-Level Jury Problem," Papers 2211.08494, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
- Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Social Choice; Ideal direct democracy; Representative democracy; Multioption decisions; Weighted Approval Voting; Weighted Majority Judgment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-02-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2021-02-01 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2021-02-01 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2021-02-01 (Operations Research)
- NEP-POL-2021-02-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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