IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/crs/wpaper/2011-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Infinite Horizon

Author

Listed:
  • Lionel Wilner

    (CREST)

Abstract

In infinite horizon, a credible durable-good monopolist may resort to intertemporal price discrimination. We provide an analytical characterization of his optimal price policy when consumers and the monopolist have different values for the trade because of distinct discount factors.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Lionel Wilner, 2011. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Infinite Horizon," Working Papers 2011-31, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-31
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2011-31.pdf
    File Function: Crest working paper version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-531, May.
    2. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    3. Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Levine's Working Paper Archive 201, David K. Levine.
    4. Stephen W. Salant, 1989. "When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 391-397.
    5. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
    6. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    7. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
    8. Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 1985. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales Strategy under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 424-430, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tian Xia & Richard Sexton, 2010. "Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(4), pages 333-349, June.
    2. Sallstrom, Susanna, 2001. "Fashion and sales," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(9), pages 1363-1385, November.
    3. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    4. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    5. Francesc Dilmé, 2021. "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 063, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    6. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    7. Sandro Brusco & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2007. "Deregulation with consensus," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(1), pages 223-250, July.
    8. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
    9. Francesco Nava & Pasquale Schiraldi, 2019. "Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1930-1968, May.
    10. Tóbiás, Áron, 2018. "Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 194-218.
    11. Luca Benzoni & Lorenzo Garlappi & Robert S. Goldstein & Julien Hugonnier & Chao Ying, 2020. "Optimal Debt Dynamics, Issuance Costs, and Commitment," Working Paper Series WP-2020-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    12. Mason, Robin, 2000. "Network externalities and the Coase conjecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1981-1992, December.
    13. Cabral, Luis M. B. & Salant, David J. & Woroch, Glenn A., 1999. "Monopoly pricing with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 199-214, February.
    14. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1997. "The Intertemporal Consequences of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 511-522, October.
    15. James J. Anton & Gary Biglaiser, 2010. "Quality, Upgrades, and Equilibrium in a Dynamic Monopoly Model," Working Papers 10-36, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    16. James J. Anton & Gary Biglaiser, 2007. "Quality Upgrades and the (loss) of Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model," Working Papers 18, Portuguese Competition Authority.
    17. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Oleg Tsyvinski, 2006. "Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," 2006 Meeting Papers 348, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Gerstle, Ari D. & Waldman, Michael, 2016. "Mergers in durable-goods industries: A re-examination of market power and welfare effects," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 677-692.
    19. Didier Laussel & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 745-771, September.
    20. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    intertemporal price discrimination; durable-good monopoly; nonlinear pricing; non-transferability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crestfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.