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Deregulation with consensus

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  • Sandro Brusco
  • Hugo Hopenhayn

Abstract

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  • Sandro Brusco & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2007. "Deregulation with consensus," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(1), pages 223-250, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:223-250
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0221-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
    2. Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Levine's Working Paper Archive 201, David K. Levine.
    3. Carl Davidson & Steven J. Matusz, 2006. "Trade Liberalization And Compensation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 723-747, August.
    4. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-531, May.
    5. Davidson, Carl & Matusz, Steven J. & Nelson, Douglas R., 2007. "Can compensation save free trade?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 167-186, March.
    6. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
    7. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    9. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
    10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.
    2. Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 371-406.
    3. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Pineau, Pierre-Olivier, 2012. "Regulation and electricity market integration: When trade introduces inefficiencies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 529-535.
    4. Stephen Parente & Anne Villamil, 2007. "Edward C. Prescott’s contributions to economics: guest editors’ introduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(1), pages 1-5, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Deregulation; D82; H21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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