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Distributional Conflict in Organisations

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  • Inderst, Roman
  • Mueller, Holger
  • Wärneryd, Karl

Abstract

Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on the division level, where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize. Second, by grouping agents into common divisions, multi-divisional organizations create free-rider problems in rent seeking. We apply our framework to divestitures and the transition from the U- to the M-form by US corporations in the 1920s.

Suggested Citation

  • Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger & Wärneryd, Karl, 2002. "Distributional Conflict in Organisations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3315
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hierarchy; Conflict; Influence activities; U-form versus m-form;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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