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Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity

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  • Paul Milgrom and John Roberts.

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  • Paul Milgrom and John Roberts., 1987. "Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity," Economics Working Papers 8731, University of California at Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8731
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    Cited by:

    1. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    2. Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 35-80, February.
    3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    4. Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Capabilities, Confusion, and the Costs of Coordination On Some Problems in Recent Research On Inter-Firm Relations," DRUID Working Papers 99-7, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    5. Da Rin, Marco & Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 366-397, October.
    6. Pak-Wai Liu & Xiaokai Yang, 1999. "Division of Labor, Transaction Cost, Emergence of the Firm and Firm Size," CID Working Papers 10, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    7. Andersson, Thomas & Brännäs, Kurt, 1991. "Explaining the Termination of Nationalizations in the Late 1970s," Working Paper Series 313, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    8. Erica L. Groshen & David K. Levine, 1998. "The rise and decline(?) of U.S. internal labor markets," Research Paper 9819, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sherrill Shaffer, 1997. "Network diseconomies and optimal structure," Working Papers 97-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    11. Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, 1999. "Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research," NBER Working Papers 6882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2006. "Resource Allocation and Firm Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 2249, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Susan Athey & John Roberts, 2001. "Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 200-205, May.
    14. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851.
    15. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    16. Birger Wernerfelt, 1987. "Market Frictions and Hierarchical Trading Institutions," Discussion Papers 743, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    18. Andersson, Thomas & Brännäs, Kurt, 1992. "Nationalizations and Investment Flows: A Panel Study," Working Paper Series 330, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    19. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Xose H. Vazquez-Vicente, 2003. ""Tying the Manager's Hands": How Firms can make Credible Commitments that make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely," DRUID Working Papers 03-10, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    20. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June.
    21. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2000. "Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0650, Econometric Society.
    22. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M. & Warneryd, Karl, 2007. "Distributional conflict in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 385-402, February.

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