IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1913.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests Vs. Prices

Author

Listed:
  • Fernández, Raquel

Abstract

This paper examines the properties of exams and markets as alternative allocation devices under borrowing constraints. Exams dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency. Whether aggregate consumption is greater under exams than under markets depends on the power of the exam technology; for a sufficiently powerful test, exams dominate markets in terms of aggregate consumption as well. The positive effects of income taxation are analysed and the optimal allocation scheme when wealth is observable is derived. The latter consists of a fellowship scheme, in which markets set school prices but the government gives out fellowships, based on need and the ability to obtain a given exam score.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernández, Raquel, 1998. "Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests Vs. Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 1913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1913
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1913
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu, Daron, 1997. "Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 61-92, March.
    2. Fernandez, Raquel & Gali, Jordi, 1997. "To Each According to ...?: Markets, Tournaments, and The Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," Working Papers 97-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1996. "Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 135-164.
    6. Becker, Gary S & Tomes, Nigel, 1979. "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1153-1189, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guilhem Lecouteux & Léonard Moulin, 2013. "From welfare to preferences, do decision flaws matter? The case of tuition fees," Working Papers hal-00807687, HAL.
    2. Laura Romero, 2005. "On the role of borrowing constraints in public and private universities' choices," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(6), pages 1-8.
    3. Elena Del Rey, 2009. "Can State University Fees Increase Welfare? A Mixed Oligopoly Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(4), pages 670-683, December.
    4. Andrea M. Mühlenweg, 2008. "Educational Effects of Alternative Secondary School Tracking Regimes in Germany," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 128(3), pages 351-379.
    5. del Rey, Elena & Romero, Laura, 2004. "Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona 12, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
    6. Jimmy Chan & Erik Eyster, 2002. "Admission Impossible? Self Interest and Affirmative Action," Economics Working Paper Archive 479, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    7. Romero, Laura & Rey, Elena del, 2004. "Competition between public and private universities: quality, prices and exams," UC3M Working papers. Economics we046423, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    8. Guilhem Lecouteux & Léonard Moulin, 2015. "To gain or not to lose? Tuition fees for loss averse students," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1005-1019.
    9. Jonathan Pincus, 1998. "Is the Treasury subsidising Australian Undergraduates? or, Investing in Higher Education," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 1998-15, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    10. Murat F. Iyigun & Andrew T. Levin, 2003. "What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(3), pages 612-627, January.
    11. Murat F. Iyigun & Andrew T. Levin, 1998. "Macroeconomic implications of competitive college admissions," International Finance Discussion Papers 613, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katsuya Takii & Ryuichi Tanaka, 2013. "On the role of job assignment in a comparison of education systems," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 180-207, February.
    2. Raquel Fernández & Richard Rogerson, 2001. "Sorting and Long-Run Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1305-1341.
    3. Fernandez, Raquel, 2002. "Education, segregation and marital sorting: theory and an application to the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 993-1022, June.
    4. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
    5. Piketty, Thomas, 2000. "Theories of persistent inequality and intergenerational mobility," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 429-476, Elsevier.
    6. Raquel Fernández & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2005. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 273-344.
    7. Chris Bidner & John Knowles, 2018. "Matching for Social Mobility with Unobserved Heritable Characteristics," Discussion Papers dp18-05, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    8. Fernández, Raquel, 2001. "Sorting, Education and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 3020, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. V. Bhaskar & Ed Hopkins, 2016. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 992-1045.
    10. Steven N. Durlauf, 1997. "The Memberships Theory of Inequality: Ideas and Implications," Research in Economics 97-05-047e, Santa Fe Institute.
    11. Du, Qingyuan & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2013. "A theory of the competitive saving motive," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 275-289.
    12. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, J. -S., 2001. "Changes in the wage structure, family income, and children's education," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 890-904, May.
    13. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2009. "Finance and Inequality: Theory and Evidence," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 287-318, November.
    14. Isaac Ehrlich & Jinyoung Kim, 2007. "The Evolution of Income and Fertility Inequalities over the Course of Economic Development: A Human Capital Perspective," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 137-174.
    15. Du, Qingyuan & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2016. "A Darwinian perspective on “exchange rate undervaluation”," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 111-138.
    16. Stark, Oded & Szczygielski, Krzysztof, 2019. "The likelihood of divorce and the riskiness of financial decisions," Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 209-229, September.
    17. Maia Güell & José V. Rodriguez Mora & Chris Telmer, 2007. "Intergenerational mobility and the informative content of surnames," Economics Working Papers 1042, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    18. Mazali, Rogério & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2013. "Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 103-131.
    19. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2009. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 253-281.
    20. Nicolas Frémeaux & Arnaud Lefranc, 2020. "Assortative Mating and Earnings Inequality in France," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 66(4), pages 757-783, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Borrowing Constraints; Education; exams; Markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1913. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.