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Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities

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  • del Rey, Elena
  • Romero, Laura

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to rise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices.

Suggested Citation

  • del Rey, Elena & Romero, Laura, 2004. "Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona 12, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
    • Handle: RePEc:udg:wpeudg:012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1991. "Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-53, March.
    2. Fernandez, R., 1998. "Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests vs Prices," Working Papers 98-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Romero, Laura & Rey, Elena del, 2004. "Competition between public and private universities: quality, prices and exams," UC3M Working papers. Economics we046423, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Grilo, I., 1994. "Mixed duopoly under vertical differentiation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1115, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Efficient Tuition & Fees, Examinations, and Subsidies," IDEP Working Papers 0501, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 01 Mar 2005.
    6. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. "Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romero, Laura & Rey, Elena del, 2004. "Competition between public and private universities: quality, prices and exams," UC3M Working papers. Economics we046423, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Guilhem Lecouteux & Léonard Moulin, 2015. "To gain or not to lose? Tuition fees for loss averse students," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1005-1019.
    3. Guilhem Lecouteux & Léonard Moulin, 2013. "From welfare to preferences, do decision flaws matter? The case of tuition fees," Working Papers hal-00807687, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analysis of Education;

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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