The Optimal Length of Political Terms
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- Loeper, Antoine & Dziuda, Wioletta, 2024. "Voters and the trade-off between policy stability and responsiveness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Elections; Term-length; Costs of change; Polarization;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2021-06-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-06-21 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2021-06-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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