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Corruption and Extremism

Author

Listed:
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Giommoni, Tommaso
  • Nicolò, Antonio

Abstract

When should we expect an opposition group to select an extremist leader or representative? This paper shows the important role of corruption for this choice. Moreover, we show an important asymmetry in the role of corruption, in that the effect on extremism exists only within the opposition group. When the elite has greater ability to use corruption to obtain a better bargaining outcome from the opposition group leader (political corruption), then the equilibrium selection of group leader is more likely to be extreme. On the other hand, the perception of an existing rent extraction by the elite in power may determine the opposite effect within the majority group. We provide strong evidence for these novel predictions using the random audits data in Brazil as exogenous corruption signals, verifying that only within the opposition (to state-level incumbents) the signals determined an extremism drift in voting. Finally, we extend the analysis to extremism and conflict risk in divided countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Morelli, Massimo & Giommoni, Tommaso & Nicolò, Antonio, 2020. "Corruption and Extremism," CEPR Discussion Papers 14634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14634
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    • Attila Gaspar & Tommaso Giommoni & Massimo Morelli & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Corruption and Extremism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21163, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Extremism; Bargaining; Delegation; Agency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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