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Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia

Author

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  • Thomas B. Pepinsky
  • R. William Liddle
  • Saiful Mujani

Abstract

Across the Muslim world, Islamic political parties and social organizations have capitalized upon economic grievances to win votes and popular support. But existing research has been unable to disentangle the role of Islamic party ideology from programmatic economic appeals and social services in explaining these parties' popular support. We argue that Islamic party platforms function as informational shortcuts to Muslim voters, and only confer a political advantage when voters are uncertain about parties' economic policies. Using a series of experiments embedded in an original nationwide survey in Indonesia, we find that Islamic parties are systematically more popular than otherwise identical non‐Islamic parties only under cases of economic policy uncertainty. When respondents know economic policy platforms, Islamic parties never have an advantage over non‐Islamic parties. Our findings demonstrate that Islam's political advantage is real, but critically circumscribed by parties' economic platforms and voters' knowledge of them.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas B. Pepinsky & R. William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, 2012. "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 584-600, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:584-600
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00570.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2022. "Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 483-506, December.
    2. Morelli, Massimo & Giommoni, Tommaso & Nicolò, Antonio, 2020. "Corruption and Extremism," CEPR Discussion Papers 14634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Attila Gaspar & Tommaso Giommoni & Massimo Morelli & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Corruption and Extremism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21163, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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