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Envelopes and geometrical covers of side-payment games and their market representations

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  • ARTZNER, Philippe
  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude
  • GERARD-VARET, Louis-André

Abstract

This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a given side-payment game having an empty core one may associate two different no-side payment games with the same (nonempty) core: the "envelope" and the "geometrical cover". The discrepancy is explained in terms of market games.
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Suggested Citation

  • ARTZNER, Philippe & d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1986. "Envelopes and geometrical covers of side-payment games and their market representations," LIDAM Reprints CORE 686, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:686
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.11.1.19
    Note: In : Mathematics of Operations Research, 11(1), 19-29, 1986
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    2. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
    3. Jean-Pierre Aubin, 1981. "Cooperative Fuzzy Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 1-13, February.
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