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Impact of Organizational Structure on Oligopolistic Pricing

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  • Cyert, R.
  • Kumar, P.
  • Williams, J.

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Suggested Citation

  • Cyert, R. & Kumar, P. & Williams, J., 1992. "Impact of Organizational Structure on Oligopolistic Pricing," GSIA Working Papers 1992-51, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:1992-51
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    2. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
    3. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    4. Bailey, Elizabeth E & Williams, Jeffrey R, 1988. "Sources of Economic Rent in the Deregulated Airline Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 173-202, April.
    5. Williams, J.R., 1992. "Strategy and the Search for Rents: The Evolution of Diversity Among Firms," GSIA Working Papers 1992-04, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
    2. John M. Connor, 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," Working Papers 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Ali Hortacsu & Olivia R. Natan & Hayden Parsley & Timothy Schwieg & Kevin R. Williams, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2312R4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2023.

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