Banking on Resolution: Portfolio Effects of Bail-in vs. Bailout
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More about this item
Keywords
Bailouts; bail-ins; bank resolution; systemic risk; bank portfolio allocation; fire sales.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2024-07-22 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2024-07-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-RMG-2024-07-22 (Risk Management)
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